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This diff has been restricted to the following files: 'rsa.c'
#
#
# patch "rsa.c"
# from [292a51fb0389c6cd8718a58566f46be58126ba86]
# to [a5bd0348ccf9497600f633057ec6028e8cf3c329]
#
============================================================
--- rsa.c 292a51fb0389c6cd8718a58566f46be58126ba86
+++ rsa.c a5bd0348ccf9497600f633057ec6028e8cf3c329
@@ -38,8 +38,9 @@
#ifdef DROPBEAR_RSA
-static mp_int * rsa_pad_em(rsa_key * key,
- const unsigned char * data, unsigned int len);
+static void rsa_pad_em(rsa_key * key,
+ const unsigned char * data, unsigned int len,
+ mp_int * rsa_em);
/* Load a public rsa key from a buffer, initialising the values.
* The key will have the same format as buf_put_rsa_key.
@@ -203,14 +204,14 @@ int buf_rsa_verify(buffer * buf, rsa_key
unsigned int slen;
DEF_MP_INT(rsa_s);
DEF_MP_INT(rsa_mdash);
- mp_int *rsa_em = NULL;
+ DEF_MP_INT(rsa_em);
int ret = DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
TRACE(("enter buf_rsa_verify"))
assert(key != NULL);
- m_mp_init_multi(&rsa_mdash, &rsa_s, NULL);
+ m_mp_init_multi(&rsa_mdash, &rsa_s, &rsa_em, NULL);
slen = buf_getint(buf);
if (slen != (unsigned int)mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->n)) {
@@ -231,29 +232,25 @@ int buf_rsa_verify(buffer * buf, rsa_key
}
/* create the magic PKCS padded value */
- rsa_em = rsa_pad_em(key, data, len);
+ rsa_pad_em(key, data, len, &rsa_em);
if (mp_exptmod(&rsa_s, key->e, key->n, &rsa_mdash) != MP_OKAY) {
TRACE(("failed exptmod rsa_s"))
goto out;
}
- if (mp_cmp(rsa_em, &rsa_mdash) == MP_EQ) {
+ if (mp_cmp(&rsa_em, &rsa_mdash) == MP_EQ) {
/* signature is valid */
TRACE(("success!"))
ret = DROPBEAR_SUCCESS;
}
out:
- if (rsa_em) {
- mp_clear(rsa_em);
- m_free(rsa_em);
- }
- mp_clear_multi(&rsa_mdash, &rsa_s, NULL);
+ mp_clear_multi(&rsa_mdash, &rsa_s, &rsa_em, NULL);
TRACE(("leave buf_rsa_verify: ret %d", ret))
return ret;
-
}
+
#endif /* DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_VERIFY */
/* Sign the data presented with key, writing the signature contents
@@ -264,22 +261,55 @@ void buf_put_rsa_sign(buffer* buf, rsa_k
unsigned int nsize, ssize;
unsigned int i;
DEF_MP_INT(rsa_s);
- mp_int *rsa_em = NULL;
+ DEF_MP_INT(rsa_tmp1);
+ DEF_MP_INT(rsa_tmp2);
+ DEF_MP_INT(rsa_tmp3);
+ unsigned char *tmpbuf;
TRACE(("enter buf_put_rsa_sign"))
assert(key != NULL);
- rsa_em = rsa_pad_em(key, data, len);
+ m_mp_init_multi(&rsa_s, &rsa_tmp1, &rsa_tmp2, &rsa_tmp3, NULL);
- m_mp_init(&rsa_s);
+ rsa_pad_em(key, data, len, &rsa_tmp1);
/* the actual signing of the padded data */
+
+#ifdef RSA_BLINDING
+
+ /* With blinding, s = (r^(-1))((em)*r^e)^d mod n */
+
+ /* generate the r blinding value */
+ /* rsa_tmp2 is r */
+ gen_random_mpint(key->n, &rsa_tmp2);
+
+ /* rsa_tmp1 is em */
+ /* em' = em * r^e mod n */
+
+ mp_exptmod(&rsa_tmp2, key->e, key->n, &rsa_s); /* rsa_s used as a temp var*/
+ mp_invmod(&rsa_tmp2, key->n, &rsa_tmp3);
+ mp_mulmod(&rsa_tmp1, &rsa_s, key->n, &rsa_tmp2);
+
+ /* rsa_tmp2 is em' */
+ /* s' = (em')^d mod n */
+ mp_exptmod(&rsa_tmp2, key->d, key->n, &rsa_tmp1);
+
+ /* rsa_tmp1 is s' */
+ /* rsa_tmp3 is r^(-1) mod n */
+ /* s = (s')r^(-1) mod n */
+ mp_mulmod(&rsa_tmp1, &rsa_tmp3, key->n, &rsa_s);
+
+#else
+
/* s = em^d mod n */
- if (mp_exptmod(rsa_em, key->d, key->n, &rsa_s) != MP_OKAY) {
+ /* rsa_tmp1 is em */
+ if (mp_exptmod(&rsa_tmp1, key->d, key->n, &rsa_s) != MP_OKAY) {
dropbear_exit("rsa error");
}
- mp_clear(rsa_em);
- m_free(rsa_em);
+
+#endif /* RSA_BLINDING */
+
+ mp_clear_multi(&rsa_tmp1, &rsa_tmp2, &rsa_tmp3, NULL);
/* create the signature to return */
buf_putstring(buf, SSH_SIGNKEY_RSA, SSH_SIGNKEY_RSA_LEN);
@@ -302,7 +332,7 @@ void buf_put_rsa_sign(buffer* buf, rsa_k
mp_clear(&rsa_s);
#if defined(DEBUG_RSA) && defined(DEBUG_TRACE)
- printhex(buf->data, buf->len);
+ printhex("RSA sig", buf->data, buf->len);
#endif
@@ -318,19 +348,22 @@ void buf_put_rsa_sign(buffer* buf, rsa_k
*
* prefix is the ASN1 designator prefix,
* hex 30 21 30 09 06 05 2B 0E 03 02 1A 05 00 04 14
+ *
+ * rsa_em must be a pointer to an initialised mp_int.
*/
-static mp_int * rsa_pad_em(rsa_key * key,
- const unsigned char * data, unsigned int len) {
+static void rsa_pad_em(rsa_key * key,
+ const unsigned char * data, unsigned int len,
+ mp_int * rsa_em) {
/* ASN1 designator (including the 0x00 preceding) */
- const char rsa_asn1_magic[] =
+ const unsigned char rsa_asn1_magic[] =
{0x00, 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b,
0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14};
-#define RSA_ASN1_MAGIC_LEN 16
+ const unsigned int RSA_ASN1_MAGIC_LEN = 16;
+
buffer * rsa_EM = NULL;
hash_state hs;
unsigned int nsize;
- mp_int * rsa_em = NULL;
assert(key != NULL);
assert(data != NULL);
@@ -358,16 +391,9 @@ static mp_int * rsa_pad_em(rsa_key * key
/* Create the mp_int from the encoded bytes */
buf_setpos(rsa_EM, 0);
- rsa_em = (mp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int));
- m_mp_init(rsa_em);
- if (mp_read_unsigned_bin(rsa_em, buf_getptr(rsa_EM, rsa_EM->size),
- rsa_EM->size) != MP_OKAY) {
- dropbear_exit("rsa error");
- }
+ bytes_to_mp(rsa_em, buf_getptr(rsa_EM, rsa_EM->size),
+ rsa_EM->size);
buf_free(rsa_EM);
-
- return rsa_em;
-
}
#endif /* DROPBEAR_RSA */